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4. Jason .tfogTrs ~~ the owner of a farm in Loudoun Cotmty containing fifty acres.

•

By deed of Sept.l9,1950, he and his wife granted to "the School Board of Loudoun
County, Virginia" one acre of the farm, the deed describing it properly. The other
pertinent parts of the deed are as follows:
"The grantors do hereby grant and convey to the School Board of
Loudoun County, Va., and their successors in office, the said one acre
of land for the purpose of erecting thereon a building to be used as a
public schoolhouse for the benefit of County school system.
"To haV'e and to hold said land so long as it is used as a public
school and if it is abandoned for such purpose the said one acr·e of land
goes back to the grantors."
The School Board soon thereafter erected a small building on the one-acre tract
which it conducted as a public two-room schoolhouse until May, 1958, at which time
the School Board completed a new consolidated County school elsewhere in the County
and completely abandoned the tract deeded to it by Rogers.
By deed dated October 13,1950, Jason Rogers and wife conveyed the entire fiftyacre farm to Horton Culpepper, which conveyance included in its description the
one-acre parcel previously deeded to the School Board.
Upon the abandonment of the one-acre tract in 19.58, Horton Culpepper entered upon
the property and tore down the building, cultivated the entire tract and planted it
' in winter wheat.
As a result of this asserted claim of ownership by Culpepper, the School Board
instituted suit against him which sought to enjoin him from using the property as
his own. Culpepper answered, claiming fee simple ownership of the one-acre tract.
(1) What estate, if any, in the one-acre tract did the School Board receive by
deed of Rogers?
i f anv. in the one-acre tract did Rogers retain?
t
(2)
esta e,
·v,
d 1' d Rogers convey to Culpepper?
~fuat estate, if any, in the one-acre tract
(3) What
~ hoo1 Board have after its abandonment of the
(4) What estate, if any, does the ~
ropert~
·
(PROPERTY)(l) The School Board received a base, qualified, or determinable fee. The
d n 0 long as" indicate a limitation and not a condition aoo the clause starting
w~rt~,.
s 11 • ~ it is abandoned" merely states what the law implies anyway when a determinvn rl l
· t t"
able fee comes fo an end by its own lim1. a 1.on.
.
. . .
· (2) Assuming that ''estate" means "interesV', Rogers reta1.ned a poss1b1hty of
reverter.
d d
"ll d
(3) In Virginia any interest in land may be conveyed by ee or W1 un er our
nveyances and(also by statute)if one conveys more than he owns all
statute
of co own passes,
' so Rogers conveyed his ~ssib ility of rever t er t o C~.pepper.
·"l
he does
th(~) None, as a determinable fee ceases automat1cally by the expiration of 1ts own
limitation.
See 190 va.676 on p.833 of Property in these Notes.
It can be plausibly argued that (l)School Board received a fee simple subject
Note: dit10
" n subsequent because of the 1tifu clause.(It is "when" in the case of
to a co676 ) Th Rogers would have retained a right to enter for condition broken
190 Va. ed·a e~er of terminati on. Then Culpeppe: would ~ave succeeded to that
also callnd
the poSchool Board would not have lost t1tle untl.l a re-entry by Culpepper
right,
a
had been made.

5. Wilsorf"Bu'Tns ~~~ed a store building in the City of Buena Vista and by agreement
in writing dated January L•l954, leased the building to Acme Insurance Corporation
for a period of two years beginning on Feb.l,l954, and terminating on Jan.31,1956,
the rent to be paid in installments of $100 per month tqe first year and $200 per
month the second year. In Dec.,l955, Burns met Acme's president on the street and
agreed to permit Acme to remain in the building after January 31,1956, at a reduced
rental of $150 per month, this beiug the extent of their conversation.
Acme continued in possession after Jan.31,1956, and paid Burns the monthly rental
of $150 until August 1,1956, when the parties agreed orally that Acme would continue
in possession until Feb.l,l959, at the same rental of $150 per month. Acme continued in possession, paid the ~~150 per month rent through Oct.31,1958, but on that
date, without notice to Burns, Acme vacated the premises and has refused to pay
.
any more rent.
Burns instituted an acticn against Acme in the proper court to recover rent from
Acme for the period from Nov.l,l958, through Jan.31,1959, reciting the above facts,
and alleging in Count(l)that under the agreement of Dec.,l955, Acme became a holdover tenant from year to year after Jan.31,1956, and was to pay annual rental in
monthly installments; and in Count (2)that under the agreement of August 1,1956,
Acme agreed to continue as tenant until Feb.l,l959, at a monthly rental of $150.
Acme demurred to Count(l)of the motion for judgment on the ground that it did not
allege a tenancy from year to year. It also filed a plea to Count (2)alleging that
the agreement was within the statute of frauds and unenforceable.
How should the court rule on the questions raised by (l)the demurrer, and (2) the
plea?
~PROPERTY)(l) The demu1·rer to count(l)should be sustained. Since the rental was
changed from $200 to $150 per month there has been no holding over under the first
lease and hence the te ~1ancy would be by the month and not by the year especially
in the case of urban property.(2) This plea is not valid. Here we have an oral lease
for five years or less, and not a contract to lease.• No further negotiations or
papers were contemplated. An oral lease for less than five years does not violate
(l)the statute of conveyances, nor(2)that provision of the statute of frauds about
contracts to convey realty as a term of years is less than a freehold estate and
hence personalty, ncr(3)that provision of the statute of frauds about contracts to
lease for more than one year since this is a lease and not a contract to lease,nor
(4)that provision of the statute of frauds with reference to contracts that cannot be
performed within the space of one year since the Landlord has already performed by
giving the oral lease. See Smith V.Payne, 153 Va.746.
5. Ass~~that Jones, Jr., is the only child of Jones,Sr., what estates, if any,
are created in Jones,Sr., and Jones, Jr.,(a)in the absence of statute, and(b)in
Virginia today, by the following language in properly executed deeds, conveying
BlackAcre as follows?
;f
(1) "To Jones, Sr., and his heirs .u
(2) "To Jones, Sr., for ten years with remainder to Jones,Jr., and his heirs, •
he has then married."
(PROPER'rY)(l){a) Before the statute of uses no estate would have been created in
anyone because there was no livery of seisin(feoffment). After the statute of uses
Jones, Sr. would have a fee simple. His son nothing but an expectancy which ~s no
estate at all.(b) In Virginia today Jones, Sr. would have a fee simple, and h~s son
nothing but an expectanc;. The words "and his heirs" ate words of limitation giving
Jones, Sr. a fee simple estate.
(2)(a) Before the statute of uses Jones,Sr. would have an estate for ten years
after entry. Jones, Jr. would have nothing as a contingent remainder of freehold
cannot exist unless the particular estate which supports it is also a freehold
estate. After the statute of uses Jones, Sr. would have an estate for ten ye~s,and
Jones Jr. would have a contingent springing executory grant in fee simple.(b)
In Vi;ginia today the result would be the same as just indicated.(!~ would.probably
not be erroneous today to call Jones, Jr 1 s.estate a contingent rema~nder s~nc e the
rules about the passage of seisin at the time of the conveyance to Jones, _Sr. are
no longer important.)

•

•

•

6. In 1~9,~tark brought an action of ejectmen~ against D~vis ~recover a.hundred
acre tract of timber land. On the trial, Clark ~ntroduced ~n ev~dence his t~tle
papers beginning with a grant from the Commonwealth dated January.2,1800, and continuing down to the deed to him dated September 3,1950, all of wh~ch had been proper·
ly and x:;romptly recorded.
.
.
Davis introduced a deed dated November 4,1935, from Jones to h~, c~nve~ng by
metes and bounds this hundred-acre tract. Davis proved that upon rece~pt of this
deed, which was also properly recorded, he entere~ on ~e l~d, believing that he
owned it, cleared part of it and built a house wh~ch, Wlth.~ts yard and garden, he
enclosed with a fence, and that he had lived on the land s~nce the.spring of 1936,
claiming it as his own. The land was generally known in t he commun~ty as his and
was assessed f or taxation in
name
The foregoing was all the evidence in the action. Who should prevail?
(Property) Davis should win. He clearly has title to the part enclosed by more than
15 years adverse possession with all the elements thereof. He also has title to the
rest of the tract under the doctrine of constructive adverse possession since he hR~.
taken possession of a part of Clark's land under a deed to the whole(color of title)
and no one else is or was in possession of the part not occupied by Davis. Under
these circumstances possession of part is possession of the whole. See Section 969
of Minor on Real Property, 2nd(Ribble's)Edition.

7. ~ent,~r'n contemplation of an extended motor trip, called Daughter into his

office and said in the presence of his secretary: "Here is my pass book for my
savings account in the Planters Bank and here is my last bank statement of my check··
ing account. These accounts are yours, I give them to you, and my secretary will be
a witness to it. I may draw out some of the money in the checking account for my
trip expenses, but I can't touch the savings without producing the book." Parent
thereupon handed the pass book and the bank statement to Daughter, who put them in
her desk.
Parent was killed while on the contemplated trip and the savings account and
checking account were claimed by both Daughter and his personal representative.
What are their rights, if any, to each deposit?
(PROPERTY) Daughter wins as to the savings account. There has been a delivery of trie
savings bank book which constructively represents the account since its production
is necessary to withdraw the funds. Personal Representative wins as to the checking
account since the ~tateinent. need not be surrendered and does not constructively
represent the account.

TG. o

5. John Scrooge, by a properly executed will, provided:

•

4~b.

."I give and devise Greenspririg Farm to my brother, Charles, for life, remainder
upon the death of Charles to his widow for life, and upon his widow's death to
~; erit College in fee, provided it establishes a law school by that time. All the
r est, residue and reaminder of my estate, real and personal, I give, devise and
bequeath to my brother, Robert, in fee. 11
John Scrooge was survived by his two brothers, Charles and Robert, who were his
only next of kin, and both of whom were unmarried. Charles married Betty after the
death of Scrooge. Thereafter, brother Charles died, and still later, his wife,Betty,
died. Merit College had established a law school at the time of Betty's death, but
not before John Scrooge's death.
Robert consults you, telling you that he wishes to claim title to Greenspring
Farm under John's will, if there is any possible way of doing it successfully.
How would you advise him?
(PROPERTY) I would advise him that the farm was his. The gift to Merit College was
contingent. It is not bound to vest, if at all, within lives in being and 21 years
since Charles might marry someone who was not a life in being when John Scrooge
died, and such a person might outlive Charles for more . than 21 years. The gift ' to
the College thus violates the rule against perpetuities and is void. This void gift
falls into the residuum which is given by the will to Robert. If the gift is void
from the beginning it would be immaterial that, as events turned out, Charles did
marry someone who was alive when the testator died and that the law school was
established while she was still alive.

T bo
6. Silas Green, the owner of the famous Blue Grass racing farm in Culpeper County,
had for many years employed as his farm manager, Bill Bear. The Last Will and Testament of Silas Green contained the following clause:
ttl give and devise my Blue· Grass farm to my only son, John, after the
death of my faithful employee and friend, Bill Bear.n
Green died on April 28,1960, and his will was promptly probated in Culpeper County
where Green resided at his death. John Green, the son, has never liked Bear and
promptly discharged him as farm manager after his father's death and ordered him
from the premises.
Bear comes to you and states that Silas Green had told him several times that he
would see that he was taken care of in his old age. Bear asks what interest, if
any, he has in the farm.
What would you advise?
(PROPERTY) Assuming that testator had no other children, then John would be his sol€
heir. If we were to hold that John took the farm at once that would be contrary to
the testator's express stipulation. If Bear does not take the farm there is thus no
one who can take it until after Bear's death . In such a situation there is an im~ · 
plied life estate in Bear. Hence I would advise Bear that he was a life tenant of
the farm.(It would not be necessary to rely on the statements of the testator).
See Restatement of Property #116.

·rt o

7.J The plaintiff let his friend, Foster, use his automobile on a mission purely
personal to Foster. Foster promised that he would return the car in good condition
in a short time. While Foster was driving this automobile it was damaged in a
collision with a car operated by the defendant. The collision was caused solely by
the negligence of the defendant. Foster, feeling that he was bound by his agreement
to return the car in good conditi on, paid to the plaintiff the full amount of the
damage. Thereafter, plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the damage done to his
automobile. The defendant set up as a defense the payment which the plaintiff had
received from Foster. As between plaintiff and defendant, who should prevail?
(PROPERTY) Plaintiff should prevail. Foster did not intend to make a gift to the
wrongdoer. Foster's paying the plaintiff should not excuse the defendant from paying for his wrong.(Since the question saya "as between plaintiff and defendant11 there
is no need of gcing into the problem as to whether or not plain iff would hol4 a / .
recovery from de~endant in t..rust for, Foster.)See 16 A.L. R 208. 'vY-:J"~~- L~l'-•
.v\ -~,.- v rf~"O::.,V
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8. Green owned a vacant lot on either side of which 1>1ere large store bu1ld1ngs 01-merl.

uy Easterly and Johnson. Green decided to erect an office building on his lot, and,

af t er giving timely notice to Easterly and Johnson of this intention, secured from
t he municipal authorities a permit for the building. The buildings on either side
extended to the respective property lines and Green proposed to occupy his entire
l ot with the office building. It was necessary to e·x cavate for the basement and
f oundation. While preparing for the foundation, Green discovered that Easterly's
foundation was weak, so he determined to strengthen it by putting concrete supports
under it, a common practice in building. In order to do this, without saying anything to Easterly, Green dug under Easterly's wall, but before the concrete supports
could be installed the wall sank several inches injuring Easterly's building. The
excavation on the west side ~as entirely on Green's lot but it caused Johnson's
foundation to crack and injure his building. All the work was done with reasonable
care and in accordance with good building practices. There was no local ordinance
regulating excavations.
Green consults you with respect to his liability, if any, to(a)Easterly and(b) ,
Johnson.
How would you advise him?
/
(PROPERTY) (a ) Green is liable to Easterly. He was a trespasser when he dug acro ss
the line without Eas terly's consent, and is liable for any damage done regardless
of the amount of care used.(b)Assuming that Johnson's land would not have caved in
in its natural conditi on then there is no liability on Green if he is not negligent.
It i s a f a ir assumption here that t he wei ght of the building caused the foundation
to crack.• If this is s o, t he los s is on Johnson and not on Green. See 80 Va.l.

2f~~or~e

•

beught a farm in Dinwiddie County, gJ.V1ng as security for the purchase
price a deed of trust for the benefit of the seller, Kramer. Later Thorpe wished
to b~y irrigation piping from Galt Machine Corporation. The corporation refused to
sell the piping to Thorpe unless made subject to a lien to secure the unpaid price.
Thorpe told Kramer of this demand and, on the persuasion of Thorpe and without
receipt of consideration, Kramer wrote Thorpe a letter saying, "I agree that any
irrigation piping which you may place on or affix to the farm shall not be subject
to my deed of .trust." On being shown this letter, Galt Machine Corperation sold
and delivered the irrigation piping to Thorpe, who executed a lien in favor of the
corpor~tion and promptly trenched and buried the pipe on the farm. Thorpe has now
become insolvent and a contest has arisen between Kramer and Galt Machine Corpora~
tion as to 'loftlo • has prior right to the irrigation piping. Whicb. should prevail?
. (PROPERTY)(CONTRACTS) Galt should prevail on any one of three theories,(a)Assuming
that Kramer had priority he has waived such priority with full knowledge of the
facts or (b) under the doctrine of pr~missory estoppel{Restatement 90) the agree,
.
ment of
Kramer needs no consideration for Galt has made a substant1al
change of
position that could have reasonably been ex)ected and injustice to Galt cannot be
prevented in any other way than by giving effect to the agreement, or(c)all parties
involved hav~ agreed to treat the irrigation piping as personalty rather than as a
fixture subjeet ·to the deed of trust on the realty. Since Kramer never relied on
the piping as part of his security no in.1ustice will be done t o him. Note: In 134
va.34 the opinion states, •wtere a party tc a transaction induces another t.o act
upon reasonable belief that he haa waiYed or will w::ive cer ta.in rights~rer:tedles,
or objections, which he is entitled to assert., he m.ll be estopp<3:1 to 1ns H~t upon
such rights, remedies, or objections to the prejudice of the one misled."
J> CP D

fa~:n in Fraf'..kJ.in County which was bcund on its north by
State Highway No.40 and (,m its: west by 0ripp1e c:,·~ek. In 1?55, Brent conveyed the
southern half of his fa:;:'m ~;o Cal Dodge,, tho deeC. of conveyance con·taining the
following provision:
"In addition to the con~·cy<.:.n:w hor-e:)y made, Brent grants unto Dodge a
perpetual easement of ingress ar!d eg:rest-, i'x-om t.he proporJvy hereby conveyed.
to State Highway No .40, 1-;hich e .:.:.r.~ment shall te 20 feet 1!1 1ddth and shall
extend from the old p:i.n o::'.k e :~ tu.::. t.ei. on the northe:rn 'tlc·m:cl.a.r y line of the
property hereby convoyad along a i;,rue northerly Cil <H'r.>e t.:.. the point where it
intersects with r.uch high~u1y. 01
The means of access to the highw~y then used by Brent was a r (j~way which ran along
the easta:rn bank of Cripple Creek~, parallel to, and dis to.n"'-- approximately 100 yards
from, tha easement granted Dodge. In O~tober of 1960, a flash flood caused Cripple
Creek to overflow its banks and wholly wash away Brent's rsad. Brent then consulted
Dodge and requestad the latter to ag~ee to Brent! s use of the easement strip as a
means of travelling to tha highway. This request was denied by Dodge who said that
he would, under no circumstances, permit J3r ent to use the easement strip. Brent
correctly alleging that h12.: had PO other rea~onabl c mP.<ms of access to the highw~y
broug."'lt a suit for a decla!'atory judgment against Dvdge in th ~ Circuit Court of '
Franklin County pray:i.ng t b.::t':. the Ccurt establish Brent' o right, to make use of the
easement strip. To what, a:ct{mt, i f any, shouJ,.d the Com.~t g::. 'ant rellef to Brent?
(PROPERTY) The relief should bo granted to t.he extent that Brent's use will not
interfere with Dodge's use o When Brent conveyfJd the easement to Dodge he{Brent)
still o~med the fee and, as s w.~h owner, can use the right ')f way in any manner not
inconsistent with the superior rights of Dodge. PubH c policy requires that everyone
have some reasonable means of accBss to his land i f ~uch right of access does not
violate the rights of othe:rs. R of Prope:rty #486 ~

4., Alfred Bront. owned a

•

•

t>' D

So John Rlehman o~ed valuable rental property t:::ituahd on Bi~d Street in the Cit

of RichmondJ) and w:J..shed to leave it to his t.on Brutus. It was common knowledge th!t

!~~:us, who was 22 ye~-:s of age and unmarried, wa;:; wholly ir.renponsible and oftsn
~ of sharp pract~ces by othersQ Knowing of these propensities, but feeling

oonvin7ed that Brutus would soon mend his way John Hic!hman duly executed the
holographic will:
'
"January 12,1959
•I, John Richman, make the following will-(1) I direct that all my just debts be paid.
(2) I devise my rental property situated on Bird Street in the City
of Richmond to my son Brutus.
(3) Should my son Brutus attempt to dispose of such rental property
within a period of five years after my death, the property shall thereby
pass absolutely to my daughter Susan Richman Potter.
(4) All the rest of my property I leave absolutely to my daughter
Susan Richman Potter and request that she be named the Executrix of
this will.
John Richman".
John Richman died suddenly on February 14,1959, and shortly thereafter his will was
duly probated and his daughter Susan qualified as Executrix. On June 15,1960, for a
valuable consideration, Brutus executed and delivered<·a deed conveying the rental
property to Earl Wilson. Susan has brought a suit against Wilson in the Chancery
Court of the City of Richmond asking that it set aside the conveyance to Wilson,
and decree that title to the rental property is now vested in her. What should be
the Court's decision?
(PROPERTY) It should be in favor of Wilson. An absolute restriction on alienation
of property conveyed to one in fee simple(clause 2 of the will) and not creating a
spendthrift trust is void in Virginia as against our public policy. One of the
incidents of a fee simple is free alienability. See 198 Va.854 on p.1720 of the
W1lls Cases in these notes.
follo~ng

•

6.D~nzales, who owned a service station on a lot in the City of Richmond, in 1959,
aommenoed a commercial parking operation charging parking customers a dollar a day.
Mrs. Nott, who had parked her automobile at Gonzales' station daily for several
years before the operation was begun, was permitted by Gonzales to continue to park
on the lot without charge. On October 4,1960, a man, dressed in mechanic's overalls
with the name of the well knmm Duncans Motor Company stamped across the back, told
Gonzales that Mrs.Nott•s automobile was to be serviced at Duncans. Gonzales allowed
the man to take the automobile for that purpose. The vehicle was never taken to
Duncans and several weeks later was found abandoned in South Carolina and in a
badly damaged condition. Mrs. Nott has brought an action a gainst Gonzales to recover
for the damage to her automobile. May she recover?
(PROPERTY)(TORTS) No. The rule in Virginia is that a gratuitous bailee is liable
only if grossly negligent. This answer is based on 178 Va.350(p814 of the Property
Cases in these notes) in which the fact situation was similar. Note:It could also
be plausibly argued that even a gratuitous bailee delivers at his peril, or that
there was only a gratuitous license in this case and hence no liability unless
there) was gross negligence, and that even if there were a misdelivery at the
bailee's peril, the remedy would be an action for the conversion of the car and not
for the damage done to it.

•

•

4~tfecedent died intestate, owning real estate valued at $100,000, and personalty
valued at $$,000; he owed Smith a debt amounting to $20,000. There survived him the
following people: His wife, Anne; an illegitimate son, Nash; his father, William;
and a brother, John.
Assuming the above amounts to be net after the payment of taxes and costs of
administration, what are the rights of the foregoing parties?
(PROPERTY) His wife, Anne, takes the whole subject to the rights of his creditor,
Smith. The $5 1 000 will first be used to pay Smith since it is personal property at
large. A wife is in second place ahead of the father()rd place) and a brother (4th
place) in the law of intestate succession. The illegitimate child of a man has no
standing. Smith can maintain a creditor's suit, if necessary, to subject the land
to the payment of the Dalance of his debt. In this case Anne probably receives more
by claiming the whole in fee subject to Snri. th' s debt than she would by taking dower
in one third for life ahead of the debt with balance subject to the debt. See V#64-1
and , ~. 64-27.
s;rk!nnibal, a devout and gentle man, died in 1961, at the age of 93, leaving a will
containing the following provision:
"All of my property, both real and personal,! devise and bequeath to such
grandchildren of mine as shall take holy orders,share and share alike. I
specifically intend to exclude my son, Scipio, whose degenerate life has
been a great source of disappointrtlent to me."
Hannibal was survived by Scipio, his sole heir at law~ and Scipio's two sons,
Romulus and Remus. Scipio seeks your a~vice as to whether the provision in the will

P·530.

;_s valid and whether he may claim his father's estate. How would you advise him?

•

(PROPERTY) Scipio is entitled to all the property. The gift to the grandchildren
violates the rule against perpetuities and is hence void. The reason it violates the
rule is that the gift was subject to a condition precedent which might possibly
happen more than 21 years and lives in being since Romulus and Remus may die today,
Scipio may conceive a child a month thereafter, he and his wife might die the day
this child is born and this child might take holy orders
twenty five years
later. An heir is not disinherited by a statement that he takes nothing, as a testator cannot change the intestate laws. In order to disinherit Scipio there would
have to be a valid disposition of the property to another by the testator,Hannibal.
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'
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6! In 1939, Hershel Weed, a mountain boy from Kentucky, moved to Southwestern
Virginia in search of a place to raise his large family. Weed found a large expanse
of mountain land which was unc.untivated and uninhabited and he immediately fenced
off 100 acres, cleared the land and built a small home, and a·t all times openly
claimed that the land belonged to him. The land upon which Weed settled was part of
10,000 acres of mountain land owned by Colonel Cathcart Julep, of Richmond. Weed
and his family lived on this tract, until 1947, at which time his bitter enenzy,Borden
Crabgrass, who had been searching for him for years, found his new home and forcibly
dispossessed Weed and his family and occupied the house and land which Weed had
possessed and claimed as his own. One year later Weed, with the help of his two
grown sons who had returned from the Army, dispossessed Crabgrass and again occupied
the property.
In 1940, Colonel Julep had been adjudged insane and was confined in a samitarium.
He remained there until his death in 1945. Colonel Julep died intestate, leaving as
his only heir at law his daughter, Amanda Julep, who was seventeen years of age at
the time of her father's death. In March of 1961, Amanda consults you, inquiring
whether she can dislodge Hershel Weed from the 100 acre tract occupied by him in
southwestern Virginia. She has become highly concerned over his presence since she
has recently married and has made elaborate plans to turn the whole area into a
mountain resort.
How would you advise her?
(PROPERTY) I would advise her that she is entitled to the land if she acts before
Weed gains title by adverse possession . Since Weed's first possession was not continuous, the statute of limitat.ions would have started to run again in 1948, but
for the fact that at that time Amanda was ·an infant, so it did not begin to run
until the next year when Amanda became of age. Since the statutory period is 15
years the statute has not run in June of 1961. The fact that the statute of limitations was ten years west of the Alleghanies in 1949 is immaterial as Weed has no
vested right in the old statutory period and he had no.t acquired title by adverse
possession in 1954 when the period was made the same(l5 years) for all Virginia.
Weed cannot tack Borden's possession onto his own as there was no legal pri:vf£y·
(such as ancestor and heir, grantor and grantee)between them.
7 .1'r~ May of 1960 Frog, a lumberjack, was gravely injured when struck by a falling
tree. While arrangements were being made to carry him to the hospital he gave a
trunk key to To_~,. ·his foreman, and told him to keep it and, in the event that he
died, to give it to Tadpole, the infant daughter of his old friend,Bul~~og, it
being his wish that all of his •~rldly possessions, which were contained in the
trunk, should go to Tadpole i f he died. After being moved t,o the hospital Frog took
a turn for the wors~ and died within a few hours. When the trunk was opened it was
found to contain a certificate for a number of shares of Ooca-Cola stock, the
present value of which was estimated atnPre than $100 1 000, a deed, dated May 1,1940,
by the terms of which a 100 acre tract of land, known as ttSwamp Acre 11 , was conveyed
to Frog, and a will, dated March 10,1945, which was in the handwriting of Frog and
signed by him and contained the signatures of two witnesses, which will was as
follows:
· "This is my last will and testament.
"Everything I have I give to my nephew, Watersnake.
/s/ Frog 11
Frog owned no property other than that described above.Who is entitle to his ,5}l..
.
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There has been a _yglid_gi£t causa m9rtis of the s~ock. The delive:y ~f-a
key · under these circumstances iP ·a.d.eHvery of the personalty ~n the ~runk. :hlS ie.
l i very may be made to an independent third party for another. The g1ft ~auoa mor t ls
is effective from the time of the gift so that there is no stock belong1ng to ~he
t estato r when he dies. But s ince there cp n be n~g!ft causa mortis or realty, ~t
passes under F~og's will to his nephew, Watersnake.

•

6.\l-bevon Corp. purchased a. strip of unrestricted real property in the City of
Richmond on the North side of Park Avenue, which it subdivided i nto twenty building
sites, all front:!.ng on Park Avenue. A plat of' the subdivtsion, entitled "Devon
/ '-<·.-'.

•

Manor", was prepared and duly recorded in the proper Clerk ' s Offi ce, but it contained no reference to a building eet-back line. Also, Dev·on Corp. did not offer for
reco r d any declaration of restrictions pertaining to the property.
Sutton saw an advertisement of Devon Corp. in a Richmond newspaper, which stated:
"Now is the time for you to own a site in Devon r1anort 50-foot building set back
line from Park Ave."
Sutton purchased a lot from Devon Corp., the deed to which contained the following: "The grantee agrees not to construct any building on the lot hereby conveyed
nearer than SO feet to Park Ave."
· Blunt likewise purchased a lot in Devon Manor, and his deed contained the same
restriction with respect to his lot as that contained in Suttonts de9d. The remaining eighteen lots ware sold, each deed containing a similar restriction. Sutton
conveyed his lot to 'l'abb, and the deed contained the same r8st riction as that contained in the deed of Devon Corp. to Sutton.
Tabb commenced the construction of a residence on his lot but only 30 feet from
Park Ave. Blunt instituted a suit in the proper court to enjoin the construction.
Asswning that a suit for injunction is the proper proceeding to test Blunt's
interest in the restriction on Tabb's property, how should the court rule on Blunt's
prayer for an in~junction?
(PROPERTY) The injunction should be granted. The building restriction was meant for
the benefit of all the lots as shollm by similar provisions in all deeds and in the
advertisement.. It was not a mere personal agreement between .t.he grantor and grantee,
Since Tabb had notice of the restriction he is bound thereby. See 148 Va. 26.
Note: It can be argued that the above facts were net enough to show such an intention and an earlier case, 132 Va. 115, gives support to such an answer.

7 .·~~obo, while wending his way alon g Harket Street in the City of Alexandria late
at night, found a $500 bill on the sidewalk. Fearful of his impulse to spend the
money foolishly, but more fearful of having it stolen from him, Hobo asked Cook, a
counter man at an all-night diner, to hold the bill for Hobo until he called for it.
Cook agreed to do so, and placed the bill in the diner's cash drawer. Later in the
night Cook was showing the bill to his customers and carelessly dropped it on the
stove. The bill caught fire and was total l y consmned, i ts ashea disappearing up
the chimney.
Hobo demanded return of the bill the next day f rom Cook, and learning that it had
been destroyed he instituted an action against Cook to recover the sum of $500.
, ~ ~ Xs Hobo entitled to recover?
:)( PROPERTY) Since Hobo found the bill in a public place he has go od t i tle as against
all the world but the true owner, and th:i.s :i.s a sufficient property interest to
permit him to sue those ~rho ne gligently or i ntenti onally interfere <vith his
rights as such owner. Cook is a voluntary grat uitous bcdl•:':lfl who owes a duty not to
be grossly negli gent. It is at least a ,jury question whether or not he ha;:; vi olated
thi s L-9 \lt! ?~ so.~~V argument or conclusion either Hay on this point is proper. / ;._ ·. · /
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5. What e~tate, if any, is created in A in Virginia today by the following language
in a deed conveying Blackacre with covenants of general war.ranty1
(a)"'To B with remainder to A." (b) '1To A for life with remainder to the heirs of
his body." (c) "To B for ten years and at the expiration of that time if A has
married C, then to A in fee." (d) "To D for life, then to C for life, then to B for
thirty years, then to A and his heirs," A,B,C and D being now living. (e) nTo B for
life, providing that if he wishes to do so, he may sell or otherwise dispose of the
land herein conveyed,but if any be left, then to A."
(PROPERTY)(a} Since words of inheritance or limitation are not necessary(as aresult of V#8-ll) to create a fee B has the whole fee and A nothing. Note' It is
arguable that since V#8-ll further states that the fee passes unless the conveyance
shows a different intent, that this conveyance does show a different intent, and
hence that A has a vested remainder in fee following an implied life estate in B.
(b) Since this would have been a fee tail in A in 1776, V#55-12 converts it into
a fee simple, so A has a fee simple absolute. Note(To reach this result one must
apply the Rule in Shelley's case. While that rule was abolished in 1850 its abolition
pagtl ;>uv•
was not retroactive. Hence in determing the law of 1776 no effect should be given to
a non-retroactive statute passed in 1850)
(c) A has a contingent springing executory limitation in fee. It is not a remainder
because a contingent remainder of freehold cannot be supported by a less than freehold particular estate.
(d) A has a vested remainder in fee simple so there is no violation of the rule
against perpetuities.
(e) Under V#55-7 which modifies the holding of May v. Joynes, A has a vest remainder .in fee subject to partial or total divestment by B's exercise of his power. The
words "for life" cause V#55-7 to be applicable. This section of the Code saves the
gift over to A if the first taker, B, is given a life estate, except to the extent
that the life tenant,B, lawfully exercises the power.

•
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6~ :.>John Smith, a rather reckless bachelor, inherited 11Redlands't from his father.

•

Pedestrian obtained and docketed a judgment against John for personal injuries in
the sum of $5,000. John thereafter borrowed $5,000 from The Tenth Bank to finance
his approaching wedding to Miss Demure. Shortly after the marriage, John borrowed
$10,000 from the Next National Bank to build a cottage. Neither bank was paid and
two years after the marriage, both banks on the same day obtained and docketed judgments against John. In addition to the above, John owed open store accounts of
$20,000. Faced with these responsibilities, John "took an overdoes of sleeping pills,
"and died intestate, owning no property but "Redlands," then worth $30,000, and
leaving surviving him his widow and an only brother~
Whe.t are the respective priorities, if any, by way of lien or otherwise, in
''-Redlands" of, (a) Pedestrian? (b) Tenth Bank? (c )Next National Bank? (d) Store and
other creditors? (e) John's widow?
(PROPERTY) (CREDITORS' RIGH'rS). Pedestrian is ahead of every one. He obtained his lien
prior to John's marriage so John was never seised of the land free from the lien
at any time during coverture. John's widow's dower is next to the extent of a one
third interest for life. The two banks are next equally. Their judgments were docketed on the same day, and there is no reason to prefer one to the other just because
the clerk entered one on the docket before the other. And, last of all, come the
general creditors pro rata.

•
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4~~andma Moses owned a small safe at her home, in which she kept her money and
securities. One day while her brother Bart was visiting her, she, though feeble but
still able to walk into the next room where the safe was located, informed Bart of
the combination to the safe and made the statement: "I want you to have everything
in the safe in the next room. You now have the combination and everything belongs to
you." Grandma Moses died a short time later without either of them having opened the
s~fe. Subsequently, Bart opened the safe and took the contents, consisting of money
and bonds payable to Bearer. Mr. Tutt, as Administrator of Grandma's estate, is seeking to recover the contents of the safe from Bart. Must Bart surrender the money
~ l f3Curities?
~{ ROPERTY) Yes. There was no valid delivery of any sort of the subject matter of the
gift. Telling Bart the combination to the safe did not deprive Gramdma Moses of her
ability to exercise control over the contents of the safe as effectively as before
the alleged gift. It is analogous ,to delivering a duplicat,e key to the intended
donee when the intended donor retains a key in his own possession, or telling the
intended donee the secret hiding place of valuables. There was no reason why an
actual delivery of the contents could not have been made, and hence we do not have
as good a delivery(if indeed there was any delivery at all) as was reasonably
possible under the circumstances. For general principles see 199 Va.87lo

5~teacre

. ..

was conveyed to Jack and Jill as follows: 11 to Jack and Jill, husband
and wife, as tenants by tll!Je entirety with the right of survivorship.n Jack, a
drunkard, became hopelessly in debt and left home. In order to secure funds with
which to buy more l'!'hiskey, Jack sought to have Whiteacre partitioned to get "his
part." At the same Ume, judgment creditors of Jack attempted to subject Jack's
undivided portion to the payment of his individual debts.
Jill became concerned and seeks your advice on two questions, namely,(l)can Jack
demand partition, and(2) may Jack 1 s oreditors subject Whiteacre to the liens of the
judgments against him?
;:n ;J.

(PROPERTY)(l) Jack is rot entitled to partition as long as the marriage lasts. Jack
and Jill are tenants by the entirety and they ;each own by the whole and not by the
)art. (2) No. Whiteaere can only be reached for the joint debts of Jack and Jill.
See 192 Va.735, and 9 M.J. Husband and Wife #29.
6. The following conveyance was mader ,'J), ~ ,· ·
ttTo Earl Jones and Amanda Jones, husoand and wife, as joint tenants, with the
right of survivorship for and during their joint lives and during the life of the
survivor of them, remainder at the death of the survivor of said joint tenants to
the issue of said Earl Jones and Amanda Jones begotten of the said marriage of the .
said Earl Jones and Amanda Jones."
At the time of the above conveyance, one child of the marriage, 'l'homas, was living.
(1) What estate was created in Earl and Amanda Jones?
(2) What estate, if any, was created in Thomas?
(PROPERTY) Earl and Amanda have a joint life estate(or tenancy by the entirety) with
survivorship. Thomas has a vested remainder in fee simple subject to opening up and
letting in subsequently born children of this marriage, if any.(This would not have
been a fee tail in 1776 since the word "issue" in a deed as distinguished from a
will was not then the equivalent of "heirs.of the body~ •

••

9PfJmon and Pythias owned adjoining properties. Damon planted an ordinary privet
hedge on his own la.nd about a foot from the boundary line. Pythias planted a rose
bed on his own land next to the boundary line. After several years, Pythiaa noticed
that the roses were not doing well and upon examination found that the roots of the
privet hedge had extended themselves across the boundary line and were sapping the
strength of the rose bushes• roots. He called this situation to the attention of
Damon and asked him to correct it. The reply wast 11 There isn't anything that I can
;, ro.
do; the roots are growing according to nature." Pythias then cut the roots along th e-;
boundary line, and as a result the hedge died.
Damon sued Pythias far damages because of the loss of the hedge and Pythias
counter-claimed for injuries t9 his rose bushes. What, if any, is the liability of
each of them?
'·
(PRCPERTY)(TORTS) There is no liability on either of them. A privet hedge is not a
poisonous or noxious growth. The harm done is trivial and law suits over such things
s.hollld be discouraged. An owner of land is privileged to use self help and cut
back encroaching roots and branches to the boundary line. See 174 Va.2l3 or 5 S.S.
2d 492 on p.810 of the Property Cases of these Notes.
4~:1'i1.fred

vJhite took his antiqlle cbi:1a catlinet to 11 Carter 1 s Fix-It Shop" for repair.
The Shop was owned and operated by Tom Carter e..s sole proprietor. Two weeks later,
White having been telephoned by Carter t hat the repairs had been made, went to the
Shop to obtain the cabinet. Carter told V.Jhite he could not let him have the cabinet
until he paid him the $J.36 repair cr:arge. Although White felt that the charge was
fair, he told Carter that he was "Jery r;;hort of funds and could not then pay the
charge and asked whether Carter would let him take the cabinet on credit. This
Carter refused to do and told Whit e t hat he must pay the cha.rge within the following
mont h. vii th that 1!Vhi te bcc:am•; qui t0 angry and left the establishment. White not
having paid during the fo llowir"g month, Carter thereafter showed the cabinet to
Arthur Creech who bought it at the reasomble price o.f ~p l)OO. Carter mailed his
check fo r the balance of $1364 to v!hite. Wilen 1!Vhite received Carter's che~k, he <f;d.
not cash it, but came to see you and inquir\.':d ~-1hether he could comp8l Creech to
sw~ nd~ to him possess ton of the cabinet.
What should ;your advice have been?
(PROPERTY ) He may compel Cr-eech to su.rrender possession of the cabinet. An improver 1 ~
co~on law lien nerely allowed the improver to keep the article until he was paid.
5(j~.

T~ih::.. le

this rule has been modified by statute, the statute must be followed to entitle one to its benefits. Carter should have foreclosed his lien pursuant to
V//43-34. Hence Carter was a converter of t}?.e cabinet a1;1d may have even lo, t _his Jl.
right 1f_o. the $136 repair b;ill. !f#? .-.A rl , ...,,, vc::. ~ -..--1- ·/;>:.,. ;(_)H)rf1 ' ' 1 ' c '/·' _5, -~
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5 !~ n April 20,1963, a widower, James Jones, executed and delivered a deed which
reoited the conveyance to Sam Smith with general warranty of title a tract of t ::..mber
land situated in Fluvanna County. Simultaneously Jones received from Smith . the
latter 's certified check for $10,000 in payment of the agreed price. Smith at once
had the deed properly recorded. Unknown to Smith, at the time of the transaction the
property was not owned by Jones but by Rufus Bott. On May 14th, Bott properly con·
veyed the property to Jones. On May 21st, Jones duly executed and delivered to
Thomas Huntley a deed to the property, Huntley paying the agreed purchase price anQ
not knowing of the prior transaction between Jones and Smith.
You are now consulted by Smith who informs you of all these facts and asks you
(a)whether he may have the deed from Jones to Huntley set aside, and (b) the nat.t::::·e
of the rights, if any, he may have against Jones. What should you advise him?
(PROPERTY)(a) Smith cannot have the deed from Jones to Huntley set aside. It is outside the chain of title and hence its recordation was not constructive notice to
Huntley. If there had been no conveyance to Huntley then Smith would have had title
by estoppel in equity as against Jones as soon as Jones acquired the land. But tbi~
right was cut off by a sale of the land to a bona fide purchaser.(b) Since this wa~
a general warranty deed without the usual English covenants of title,seisin,power
to f~~vey ~tc . ~ith.has n? action against Jones for violation of the covenan~ of
gen~ ~~ar~htyJ unt~l he ~s actually or constructively evicted from the prem1ses
by Huntley. See Minor on Real Property(Ribble)#l055 and V#55-l05.

•

6;r1ferbert Homer died in 1949 leaving a holographic will which was duly probated and
which provided:
11
Nove11ber 4, 1946
11 This is my last will.
1. I name my son Jerry Homer to be the Executor of this will and I
direct him to pay· all my debts promptly after my death.
2. I devise my residen~e at 1212 Clayton Street in the City of
Richmond to my friend Arthur Brown for life and on his death to his son
Paul Brown in fee simple should he then have become twenty-one years of age.
3. All the rest of my property I leave abr.olutely to my son Jerry.
(s) Herbert Homer"
Paul Brown became twenty-one years of age on Sept.lO,l959. On February 12 1960
he married Sarah Brent. Paul died on October 1, 1960 leaving surviving him ~nly his
widow Sarah and his father Arthur Brown. Arthur Brown died on May 30,1963.
A contest has now arisen between Jerry Homer and Sarah, each claiming title to the
residence in the City of Richmond.
Which should prevail?
(PROPERTY) Sarah shbuld prevail. When Paul Brown became 21 his contingent remainder
vested. When he died intestate Sarah inherited Paul's vested remainder which became
possessory on the death of Arthur Brown.

·•

4 b(a) Octogenarian, a successful farmer, conveyed his farm by deed containing the
following language:
nTo my son, Anthrax, for life, with remainder over , in fee simple, to my
nephews, Buster, Custer and Dllster, in equal shares."
Buster consults you, advising that all grantees are li,~ng , that the farm is
not susceptible of partition in kind, and stating his desire to procure the sale
of the farm in a suit for partition.
May Bllster successfully prosecute a suit for partition?
(b) Esau, owner of Green Acre, sold a one-half undivided interest in Green Acre
to Herod. Later Esau conveyed the other one-half interest in Green Acre "to Isaac
for life, with remainder to Joseph.'•
Isaac consults you and inquires whether he may compel partition of the land.
How would you advise?
(PROPERTY)(a) No. Only co-owners of present possessory interests may compel partition. Anthrax has the right to enjoy the whole of this parcel for his life as per
the conveyance to him. 85 Va.28.
(b) Yes. Herod and Isaac are tenants in Common of present possessory interests,
and are entitled to partition. If this requires a sale, a court of equity can make
its decree in such a way as to protect the rights of Joseph, a remainderman.91Va.ll4.

5 PG~a) Kodak conveyed Green Acre to Ima Light. The deed of conveyance contained the
following language:
npor and in consideration of the sum of $10,000, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, Kodak, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey Green Acre to
Ima Light, her heirs and assigns forever, with general warranty."
Shortly after Light recorded her deed, Pressure, a prior judgment lien creditor of
Kodak, procured the sale of Green Acre in a judicial proceeding for the satisfaction
of his judgment, and Ima Light was dispos sessed of the property.
Ima Light consults you, advising that she would like to sue Kodak for the breach
of the warranty contained in her deed. . May she recover?
(b) On Janllary 2, 1955, Honaker conveyed the fe e simple title to Black Acre to
Goshen by a general warranty deed. On April 1, 1960 , Kodak, believing that he had
inherited the fee simple title to Black Acre upon the death of Honaker , executed
and delivered a deed for Black Acre to Meter. The deed contained the following
langllage:
••For and in consideration of the Sllm of $5,000, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, Kodak, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey Black ~ere to Meter,
his heirs and assigns forever. I hereby covenant that I have the nght to convey
the said land to the grantee ,n·
Thereafter Meter, believing himself to be the ovmer of Black Acre, executed and
delivered to Spector a deed containing the following language:
»For and in consideration of the Sllm of ~P5 , 000, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, I, Meter, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey Black Acre to
Spector. his heirs and assigns forever."

U\. ' { o
Shortly after Spector had obtained his Jro_ ed he was ou.P*-ed f
·
-~
o po8 "~e ssJ.on
of the
property by Goshen •
.S.pector consults you and inquires whether he may sue Kod.o~k on the covenant contained in Kodak's deed to Meter. How WOllld you advise?
(PHOPERTY)(~) Yes. A covenant of general warranty is broken when the grantee is
ou~ted by V1rtue o! some one else's paramount rights. See 2 Minor on Real Property
(RJ.bbles Ed , ) #105':J.
(?) No • Kodak 1 s covene.nt of right to convey vvas broken as soon a.s it .,ras made.
BroKen covenants are independent choses in action not running with the land . Hence
Spector cannot recover from Kodak. 2 Minor on Real Property(Ribbles Ed) #1056.

6P~easel, an employee of Whales, Inc., purchased a us ed cabin cruiser and secretly
moved it on to his employer's property. Whales, Ine.~ was engaged in the business of
selling marine fixtu~es, but it did not sell boats. Without t he knowledge or consent
of his employer, Weasel spent most of his working hours in repairing and rebuilding
the boat.He stold from his employer paint, glass for the windows, seats and plumbing
equipment for the interior, brass rails and fixtures, lights, steering apparatus and
other articles too numerous to mention, all of which articles he used in restoring
the boat. Shortly after the work was completed, Whale, the owner of the Corporation,
discovered his employee's misconduct and summoned him to his office. Whale presented an itemized list of the articles stolen and demanded that Weasel pay for all of
them and, further~ that Weasel reimburse the Corporation f or the salary he received
while he was working on the boat. Weasel refused and announced that he was quitting
the company. Whale, in a rage , threw him out of the office and ordered that he be
barred from the premises. Whale then executed on behalf of the Corporation a bill
of sale of the boat to Swordfish, a wealthy playboy, who paid the agreed price of
$4,000 and took possession of the boat.
Weasel consults you. In your investigation you find that Whales, Inc. has since
become insolvent and both it and Whale are in receivership, and that Swordfish was
a bona fide purchaser for value, and without notice of Weasel's ownership.
'Wfiat: rights, if any, doe s vJeasel have against Swordfish?
(~RSONAL PROPERTY)Weasel may bring a possessory action for the cabin cruiser, or
sue SWordfish for its conversion. The cabin cruiser was the principal thing, Title
to the stolen articles pass ed to Weasel by accession as he atta ched them to his
cabin cruiser insofar as they cannot be separated therefrom without doing damage
thereto. One who purchases another's property from a thief or converter is a converter by the very act of purchase in most jurisdi ctions. Brown on Personal Property
(2d)Ed. ##25 and 28.
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4 ;rSahdy MacHeath, widower, died possessed of a certain farm and in his will providsd
"I devise my farm to my daughter Heather Macl-Ieat.h, but if she should die without
having any children of her own, then I want it to go to the children of my firstborn son, Angus MacHeath, but to no others except the children of my son, Angus
MacHeath." At the time of the making of the will, Heather was unmarried, and Angus
was married and had one child, Laddie MacHeath. At the time of Sandy's death, Angus
had two children, Laddie and Paddy, but Heather 1-1as still unmarried. Five years
subsequent to Sandy's death, Heather, who had been living on the farm, married
Tom MacDougal, and they continued living on the farm seventeen more years but had
no children, and Hea·t.her died on June 26, 1964, survived only by her husband, Tom,
whom she has named as her sole beneficiary in her will. During the seventeen-year
period, Angus had two more children, named Harold and Lauder. Angus, Laddie, Paddy,
Harold and Lauder are all now living.
Laddie and Paddy contend that they have the right to the immediate and exclusive
possession of hlle farm.
Harold and Lauder contend that they have the right to immediate possession along
with La.ddie and Paddyo
Tom MacDougal contests all their claims.
What estate, interest, or right in the farm, if any, did Heather MacHeath have;
and what estate, interest, or ~ight in the farm, if any, do Laddie and Paddy
.HacHeath, Harold and Lauder MacHeath, and 'fom MacDougal have't
(PROPERTY) Heather MacHeath had a defeasible fee subject to a contingent shifting
executory devise in favor of Angus' children. The four grandchildren are tenants
in common in fee. There was a contj_ne, ent class gift in their favor and the class
did not close until their estates became possessory. They hold this fee simple
subject to Tom MacDougal's curtesy. He is entitled to curtesy under the prolongation theory since his wife was seised of an estate of inheritance during coverture
which issue of the marriage, i f any, might possibly inherit as heirs of the wife,
and the wife's estate came to an end on her death wl thout impairment of her seisin.
5. ~~ger, a childless widow, OHnEld hro lar ge farms called the ,.Hill Farm" and the
"Valley Farm" and als o owned a large house in t.own, certain stocks and other intangibles, and tangible per sonal property of considerable value. In 1955, Dolvager
executed a valid will bY w11ich she provided in part"
"'i'o Tom Jones, nephew of my late husband, I leave in fee simple all that tract
of land known as the 'Valley Farm' and also my shares of stook, money, and all
other intangible property after payment of charges against my estate.
bi::4o

•

uTo Sally Strange, my niece~ I leave all the rest and residue of my property
not otherwise disposed of, whether realty or personalty •11
In 1957, Dowager was adjudged mentally incompetent, and a committee was appo i ntE:d
to manage her affairs. In 1959, it became apparent that the two farms were to be
taken by the Federal government for a reclamation project, and the committee under
court direction and in a proper suit sold the timber on the "Hill Farmn for $5 ,000 ,
The condemnation proceedings against the two farms were settled in 1960 wit.h
approval of the court by payment of $30,000 for the "Valley Farm" and $15,000 for
the "Hill Fa:rm.n Dowager died in 1961. Tom Jones conceded that Sally Strange was
entitled to the town property and tangible personalty but claimed that he, Jones,
was entitled to the money realized from the sale of the timber and from the condemnation of the "Hill Farm." A suit was instituted to decide the controversy. It
was stipulated at trial that Dowager was competent at the time of mald.ng her will
but incompetent from 1957 to the date of her death.
Who is entitled to the $5,000 timber money and the $15,000 condemnation settlement pai d for the "Hill Farm11 ?
(PROPER1Y) Sally Strange is entitled to both sums. There has been an involuntary
conversion of realty to personalty under such circumstances that Dowager is powerless to change her will. The money for the timber and the Hill Farm takes the
place of the timber and farm as the proceeds can be traced from the realty to the
personalty. There is no reaoon why Tom Jones should profit at Sally Strange's
expen~e just because the federal government needs the land. See 194 Va.528.

6[~lymond,

a businessman in Suffolk, Virgini a, had finished transacting some
business with an acquaintance, Starbuck, when Starbuck mentioned that he was going
to Portsmouth, Va., that day. Raymond asked if Starbuck ~auld do him a favor and
take a draft for ~~1.,000 to the Portsmouth Loan Company and bring back the money.
Starbuok said he would be glad to do i t but intended to do some visiting, etc.,
and wouldnt be coming back from Portsmouth until late at night. Upon receiving this
information, Raymond, not wishing to take a chance of loss of the money by being
brought back late at night, then asked Starbuck to take the draft to Taylor, another
businessman in Suffolk, and ask Taylor to send the draft by some responsible person.
Starbuck took the draft to Taylor , but ~aylor said that he was busy and asked
Starbuck to take the draft to the bus depot and give it to Williams for Williams
to take to Portsmouth. Starbuck went by the bus depot, but Williams told him he
was not going to Portsmouth that day.
Starbuck boarded a bus to Portsmouth. and took the draft and when he arrived in
Portsmout h got the money for the draft and carefully put it in his inside ccat
pocket. He then visited several friends, had several drinks of whi skey but never
became intoxi<~ated, and che(Jked on the money peri odically. Starbuck started home
in the early morning hours, sharing a taxi with f our strangers. When he arrived
at his room, he discovered that the mo ney was gone, and he was never able to find it
Raymond brought an action against Starbuck for the $1, 000 . Is Starbuck liable'Z
(Pk_RSONAL PROPERTY) Yes. When Starbuck violated his instru~tions he became a wrongdoer ai1d is absolutely liable for any loss regardless of negligence. The gratuitous
bailment came to an end when Starbuck took it upon himself to act contrary to his
instructions. Because of tl)is v:i,oJ.at;Lon the . very t hing that Raymond sought t .o av2id
.J_ iJJ'1~.,.,.~J .--...'. L/ )! ,4, / 1 -y- ~ :S.f'l/ ;, .~'hi-c. ,_ ,q ..r~·
occurred • See 131 Va .. 479 • '{L?io!M
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Brown, in c onsideration of nattu-al love and aff ection, conveyed a storehouse a n~ lot in Charlottesville to nAbel Bro"-'!1 and Ethel Brown, hus band and wife ,
as tenant-s by the entireties .• with r i ght of survivorship as at common law •11 Sever al
year s l ater Lubin secured and docketed a judgment a gainst Abel Brown, and later
Abel Br mm became insolvent. Lubin consults you as to his rights, if any, with
r espect to the storehouse and loL How ought you to advise him?
&;PROPERTY) I would advise him tha'0 he had no r ights against t.he lot and store. Only
creditors haYing joint claims against husband a1;.d ~'life can r each proper ty held by
them as t enants by t he entiret ies wit h survivorship . Sinc e each owns the whole and
neit her owns jus t a part t he wife 1 s interest in t he Hhole canno t be t aken to pay
hus band 's cre ditors~ See 192 Va. 737 on p olll.3 of the Credi·co r s Rights Cases in
t hesEJ Notes.
L>. L~
5 . Tes tator i n Virginia d evis ac~ • my farm t o my wi f e , .Jane, for her life, with remainder in f ee to Sam my son by my first marr iage ." After the death of her husband,
Jane consul ts you and asks the f ollowing ques tions:
(1) Who is liable for the taxes ?
(2 ) S~ppose miner al i s f ound on t he l and, may I g2-t t he r oyalties on i t ?
(3) If I want to sell e.ll t he t L11bar ~ may I do so?
(4) I f I don't want to farm i t may I j ust a llow i t tc grow up in briars?
(5) Do I have t o keep the buildings on the proper t y i nsur ed?
How ought you to ansv: er thes e que s tion~?
(P~OPERTY ) (l ) The l ife t enant, Jane, is liable f or current t axes since she receives
current income .
(2) No , as it would be 1.v-aste to open new mj_nes. The minerals are t he corpus of
the land, and not part of the c;urr ent income where no mines hc:>.ve been opened.
(3) No, for t he s ame reason a s above .
(4) If ordi nary r easonahle husbandry under t he parti cular cir cumstances would requir e cul tivation then she would be liable f or permissiv-e waste f or fa ilure so t o
cultivate. See 56 Am . Jur . at p.h62.
(5 ) No . The remailiderman has an i nsurable interes t and if he want s t he bui ldings
insured that is a matter for his attent ion .
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5 iikat estate, if any, i s creat ed in A at common law and in Virginia today by the
f~llowing language in a deed c onveying Blackacre -..rith covenants of general warranty?
(a) "To B with remainder to A."
.
11
(b) "To A for life '-Jith r emainder t~ the heJ.r ~ of his body.
(c) nTo D for life, then t~ C fo r l.~f~, then to B for t hirty years, then to A and
his he irs, A, B, C and D b e1ng now ~lVJ.ng... .
.
(d) nTo B for life, provi ded that lf he WJ.snes to do so, he may sell or othennse
11
rH !'mMP. of th e land herei n c onv evP.rl. hllt. if anv _9.~- -l~ t·t., . ·~_l}~TJ ~to A~
_( F~OPE RTY) (~) At coion law A would ho.ve c.. ves t ed remainder for life as the w·o~·ds
ne u~ o:: ~e1rs of A
badlY" w~u~d b? n ecessary to crea te a fee simple or f e e t ;:nl.
In Vlr~J.nla tcd.::o_y wor s Of\ lJ.mJ. tat1on are no longer necessary to creo.te a f ee s o
tha t A s remainder vmuld be in fee simple G Note 2. It is arguable that
ha s npt hing
s i nce B would now have the whole. The statute(V// 55-11) involved reads, "Wh·3n any
real es tate is conveyed, devised or granted to any person rtri. thout any words of limit a tion su ~h devise, conveyance or grant shall be construed to pass the f ee (:J i mple or
other whole estate or interest which ·the testator or gra.ntor h~s powe r t o d is p~se of
in s uch r eal estate, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, con•eyanc(
or grant ~ "
(b) At common law A woul d have a fee tail because of the Rule in Shelley's Case~
A woul d have a fee simple in Virginia bece.use of Vl/55-12 vrnich state s that whatever
would have been a fee tail on October 7, 1776 shall be a fee simple. Since the r ule
in Shelley's Case was not changed until 1850 and was no t changed retroactively the
aboliti on of that Tule in 1850 had no e ff ec t on the l aw a s it "'as in 1776.
(c) At common lavr and in Virginia A has a vested r emainder in fee simple the enj oyment of which mus t a.wait the expiration of the prec edi ncs es tates . There is no
abeyanc e of the seisin and th e Rule a g<:U.nst Perpet uities doe s not a pply to vested
remainders.
(d) At common law in Virginia the conveyance to A of 1-Jhat might be l eft was void
for repugnancy and uncertainty. B had t he whol e s ince a l :i..fe estate plus the potver
to dispose of it in f ee in a ny way -wa s r ea l J.y ::~. i ea in :0 . Ha y V n Joyne s.
By V// 55-7 wher e the firs t tal~er t aKe~ a n o3t en sib le l ife es tate tvi th power to
defeat the gift over at his pl easure the conveyance O'Ter wi ll not fa i l except to the
extent that the life tenant m'ly have exercis ed his pov-rer. Thus today A would have a
vested r emainder in fee simple subj ec t t o pa rtial or t otal divestment to t he extent,
if any , that B should exerc is e his pmmr of di s posal .
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6 oJ Henry Jonee and his Aunt Della , in whos e home he had lived vJi thout paying board
for ma ny years, went to t he First Na t i ona l Bank of Harr·isonbur g whe r e he r ent ed in
her name a safety d 2posit box . HhiJ.e the re Del la s i gned a card di recti ng t he Ba nk
to pe rmi t Jones to e nter nmy deposit boxtf a t any t i me , A r e ~ ei pt in her name for
one year 's r e nt paid by J ones and du.pl icate k eys vlere delivered to J ones .
Ne ither Jones nor Della opened the box when i t was rented, but J one s t hen told
Della tha t the box t-Jas hers and an y money f ound i n i t would be her s . TtJhen they r eturned to Della v s home , J ones gave her both keys t ·? the box. She never s aw Jones
put. a ny money i n the box a nd she neve:c ent e-r·ed i t du~i ng hifl lifeti~ e . From time to
time he borrowed the keys and r e tur ned t hem t o her wJ. thout explana tlon. About ten
days befor e he di ed : he borrowed th e keys and did not r e t ,1rn them. Wh en Jones di ed,
t he box contaj ned ~~8 ,000 i n cur r ency .
In an a cti on by J ones ' Admi nis tra t or a gains t Della ) sh::; claimed t hat th e money in
the s afet y deposi t box c 0nstitut ed a n .~nt~:_ ylv_?~ gif t ·i;.o her.
(A) ltla s the bnr·d en of proof upon J ones 1 Adm:i. n ~stra t or ~?, s how t ha t t he money b elonged to Jones 7 Esta t.e or upon Della t~ est ablJ.sh th e gJ ..L t ? .
(B) Upon proof of t h e above facts , vY!u ch pa rt:r Rboultyr ev-a1.l in t his ca se?
(PEHSONAL PROPERTY) (A) Tne bm·~ en of pr_a.Qf _Ha s on t5ft'f a t o est ablish the gift. She
i s tfie one who c l aims that a g1ft bas b8e ~ made and th~ J~w does n a t. pr e sume a gift,
a nd the f act vf a gi f t mus t be s hown by dear and convuK' lng evi dence .
(B) Jones ' Admi nistra tor sh~uld p1·eva i l. To be an inte~ vi vos gift t~ ere must-have
been a n in
·
ma.ke-t.l:le_glft a t the_:y:e.cy___tirne.. o.f plam,og_ the_money :tn the safety
depos i t
, _ ll.nd.
dent dellYe r ~r . Since .Tones had the keys in his possession
a nd no money was fo und in t he box un· ,i l aft er J onzs ' dea th t her e is no s uffi c i ent
proof of eithe r the intent t o make a gi f t i n praese n t~. ; ,.or of a de~iver y to Della
l'Jho was not even given t he keys • See 199 Va . 871, or .;. 9";1 Va. 877 ( s 1.c) o f the
Pro perty Ca s e s on P. 850 of t hese notes .
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A large farm in Rockingham Cou!"lty wc>.s partitioned into 2 tracts, designated as
I.ots Nos. 1 and 2, by the heirs in 1895. Lot No~ 1, vJhich a.butted on a public road~
waa conveyed to Heir A. Lot No. 2 was conveyed to Heir B "together with a right of
way by the present road through Lot No. 1 to the County roa.d •" The deed conveying
Lot No. 1 to Heir A also provided for the right. of way. The private road was no·jj
shown on the partition plat and i t vJas described in the deeds only as "the
pr-esent road."
In 1943 Realty Corporation aoquired 126 ac~2s of Lot No. 2 from Heir B. In 1947
Smith became the owner of 335 aeres of Lots Nos. 1 and 2. The road traversed his
portions of Lot No. 1 but r;,ot Lot No. 2 • His deed was made subject to the right
of way established in the aforosaid partitiona
When Realty Corporation advised Smith of its intention to subdivide its tract for
residential purposes and to use the road across Smith's land, a dispute arose betwee1
the parties. Realty Corpora·t:.ion insti tuted a chancery suit and sought an adjudication that it had a right of way over Smith's land . I n t hat suit Smith contended

•

that~

(A) As the deed to Realty Corporation did not recite a conveyance of a. right of
Nay oYer the private road through the property Smith later acquired, Realty Corporation could not use said road.
(B) If Realty Corporation had a ri ght of way, it could not exceed the width of the
farm road existing in 1895, the travel ed portion being limited to a single track not
exceed exceeding 10 feet and the outside width, includi!'lg cuts, fills, ditches and
improvements, at no point exceeding 15 feet.
(C) Re~J.ty Corporation could not u:::e the road for the purpose of developing or
serving the residential subdivision, and ita ri ght of way, i f any, was limited to
the 1895 use consisting of normal farm and residential use of not more than two
single family dwellings, together wH,h appurtenant tenant houses.
How should the Chancellor rule on t he ·•.rarious cont.o!'ltions of" Smith?
(PROPERTY)(A) Smith is wrong here. A deed of r ealty conveys appurtenanc8s thereto
even though they are not mentioned. 'I'he ri ght of way was such an arrurtenance in
this instance, (B) Smith is right :i.n this matte:.:· . A fift een foot road cannot be
ma.de into a private eaoement for a .30 foot road just because changed conditions
would make it desirable. If Realt:r Co:cporation has an urgent need for a 30 foot
road let it t ake proper steps for th e openlng of a public r oad. (C) Smith is wrong
here. The right of way was appurtenenC. to Realty Corpora+,ions 1 land, and may be used
as a road by anyone having a pcwsessory interest in the :!..and. See 20h Va .245.
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6. John Swift died intestate in 1936 leaving surviving him as his only heirs his
sons, Tom and Harry. Among the property comprising the estate of the decedent was a
farm known as 11 Rookwayn in Nelson County, Va. Approximately two years before the
death of John Swift, his son, Harry, had gone to the City of Norfolk to earn his
living~ However, Tom Swift had remained at Rockway farming it, and believing him, elf to be the owner of the farm following the death of his father. In 1956, Tor.1
Swift,, in exchange for the cash purchase price of $30 ,000, executed and dclivP.r· c·:~ : .:.
general warranty deed purporting to convey the e!"ltire fee simple interest in th ~
farm to Roger Camp. In 1959, Harry Swift died unr.J.arried and leaving a vJill by whi -:;h
he devis&d and bequeathed all his property of every description to his brothe:.v- , '.rom.,
In 1964, Tom Swift died intestate leaving as his only heir his son, Ben Swift. lr:
October 1965, Ben Swift brought a partition suit against Roger Camp in the Cir~ait
Court, of Nelson County, and in his bill ai~.eged the foregoing facts, further a.ll0g ed
tho property could not be divided in kind, and prayed that a decree be entered r equiring a sale of Rockway farm and a division of the proceeds of sale equally betwe~r.
himself and Camp. Camp has demurred to the bill,
How should the court rule on Camp's de~ur~er?
(PROPERTY) Camp's demurrer should be sustained. When Tom conveyed property he did not
own(Harry's share) by a warranty deed, and later acquired title to the property he
did not own, the title to the latter passes by estoppel both at common law and unde~
Virginia Statute V/155-52. Tom's son is not ~ boma fide purchaser for value and
hence stands :i.n Tom 1B shoes.
t:~l' 'f'j J'-; fl..;/.-
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In October of 1965, Tom_Seedy, a widower residing in a hotel in the City of
Richmond wrote out, signed and delivered to Sam Bull the following paper:
"Having received $20 1 000 from Sam Bull in payment therefor, I hereby
convey to him all real property owned by me in Hanover County, Va.,
Witness my signature and seal this 15th day of October, 1965 •
Tom Seedyn
Shortly thereafter, Paul Wood, a tenant at will on one of Seedy's three farms in
Hanover County, refused to leave the farm when directed to do so by Bull. Bull
then brought an action of ejectment against 'lnTood. On the trial of the action, Bull
proved his payment to Seedy of $20 .~000; proved the delivery to him by Seedy of
the paper writing, dated October 15, 1965, but admitted on cross-examination that
the writing had not been recorded. When Bull rested his case, Wood moved the court
to strike Bull's evidence contending that Bull had failed to prove ownership of
the farm by a valid deed from Seedy. As the grounds of suol1 motion, Wood averred:
1. The paper writing of October 15, 1965, had not been recorded;
2. The writing did not describe the farm occupied by Wood1
3. The writing did not recite Seedy's source of title;
4. The writing contained no acknowledgment;
$. Seedy's signature to the instrument was not under seal.
How should the cour·i:; rule on each ground assigned by Wood?
(PROPERTY) The Court should rule against Wood in each case. (1) Recording ie unnecessary as between the parties. Hence Seedy's deed passed the legal title to
Sam Bull.(2) The description, "All real property owned by me in Hanover County''
includes the farm occupied by Wood. Evideme outside the deed is admissible to
identify the land conveyed.(3) A deed need not set forth the grantor's source of
title.(4) Acknowledgment is only necessary for purposes of recordation(5) By
V#ll-3 a writing executed by a natural person which sta es th51t i1; is sealep ;is a 1
sealed instrument even though it has no seal. f! P {_1, /d .1. , (~ .,. f.. <t' f.• · · /-· <1 <•--f· 1to t- ---- ' ,J_

5~llings leased his large public garage building in Buchanan, Va., to Henry

Tucker. The wri.~n lease provided that it was to continue for one year from th0 rkto
thereof, at a total rental of $1200, said rental to be paid in monthly installn-;.on·';c
of $100 each. The lease granted to Tucker an option to purchase the property fo:c
$40,000, provided the option was exercised on or before the expiration d:.:.te of the
lease. The lease contained no provision for renewal upon the expiration of the lease.
Tucker continued to occupy the property after the expiration of the term of the
lease and paid to Billings $100 each month for a period of four months, althougl':>.
there was no agreement between the parties extending or renewing the leaf.E"o At t,;,_f'l
end of four months Billings received an offer from Rufus Gilbert to purcLa~w t bf.'';
property for $45,000. Billings gave a thirty-day written notfce to Tuckeu: to WlC·"t·:..~
the property. Upot). receipt of the notice, Tucker wrote a letter to B.i llinp, s c.JH"'j •. n~
that he expected to occupy the premises for the remainder of the year fo:Ll .'wing -':.he
expiration date of the written lease, his occupancy to be upon the smne te ..·ms coutained in the written lease. Also, in his letter Tucke!· a.dvis<?d Billings that he
exercised his option to purchase the property for ~~40,000, and that on the day before the expiration date of the new one year period, he would tender the purchase
money and demand a deed for the property. Billings consults you and asks you to
advise him:
1. Whether Tucker has the right to remain in possession of the property
for the additional one year period upon the terms contained in the
written lease; and
2. Whether Tucker's letter was an effective exercise of the option to
purchase the property.
How would you advise him?
(REAL PROPERTY) Holdover from lease for one year establishes new tenancy for same
period of time as original lease, i.e., 1 year and not 1 month. Therefore in Part 1,
Tucker has the right to remain in possession for an additional year. But, Part 2,
it was provided that the option was to be exercised on or before "the exp:lration
date of the leasen and therefore the option expired at the end of the or.i.ginal
term. 1 Minor, #368; Pierce, 92 Va. 753; Elliott, 127 Va. 166, Ruben, 186 Va. ?e6.

_6;>~~bert Landacre took possession of a farm in Goochland County, Va., that was

devised to him by the will of his uncle, Virgil Scotto Shortly after taking posses~
ion of the farm Landacre sold and conveyed it to James Greenfield, Landacre•s wife,
Maud, joining in the deed. The deed contained this covenant:
nAnd the said Robert Landacre and Maud, his wife, covenant that they have a
good right to sell and convey said property, and that they warrant generally
the title thereto."
Some months later James Greenfield sold and conveyed this farm to Torn Hedgerow, but
the deed contain~d no couenants or warranties. It later developed that Virgil Scott
did not own the farm, and thGt Landacre did not acquire good title under Scott•s
will. Hedgerow w~s dispossessed at the suit of the legal holder of title. Thereupon
Hedgerow commenced an action against Robert Landaore and Maud Landacre to recover
dan1ages for the breach of the covenants containeu in their deed to Greenfield.
May Hedg~row recover from either or both of them1
(REAL PROPERTY) General warranty runs with the land with respect to the husband, but
no action against husband on the right to convey because covenant broken when made.
Wife is not liable as to eithor general warranty or right to convey as Va.Code 55-41
requires that the deed expressly state that wife's entering into st~ch covenant or
warranty for the purpose of binding herself personally in order to hold her for
breach thereof. Minov, ## 406, 407; McDonald, 112· Va.749.

4~ ~atil<la and Dolly, mother and adult dauc;ht cr , ·;ncu that they ~:ould live

to ~e t hc r and ta':c car e of each other durinr.· the r cmainds r of. their lives .
Thc:y f ound a nice cottage o~med by Frngilc: a ;~idouo:L·, and of:Ccr ed to buy
the same
Fra ::;ile ' c tuo children, vho -:-rer e sole benef iciaries under his
Fill, u0r c very much opposed to t he salG of the property, but ~· ra r:;il o
i gnored their pl"otos t s and ontored into a valid ~Jritten contract ;,rith
hatilda and Dolly f or the sal e of the property . fJ t cr the sales contract
uas executed, ac'.:noul odGed, and adJ,Jittcd to record, but prior to the tirne
for clos inc; and beforG tho dcod ':!aS executed, I'ra;::ile died testate, 1:-i th
the uill statins t ha t all of his property oi every ·~ ind should be shared by
tho t Ho children. '.i.'ho t1~o children directed Pi rst .aan 1 ~ , ~ragile 1 s executor
under tho ~ Jill, t o t a ':o no action i n r@gard t o the property, contc ndin~ that
it had pac0od directly to t horo under the uill •
.a tilda aml Dolly consult you a0 to their ri.:ihtD to have the property
co nveye d to them?

•

4. Matilda and Dolly have a right to a conveyance of the cottage by
Virginia Statuto 64-138, \Jhich provides: that if any deceased person shall
have a bone f ide sale of any land and shall have given a uritten contract
to the purchaser to convey the same, if the 1~itto n a~recment has been
duly r ecorded, his ey£ cutor or administrator may, upon payment of the price
or the balance ther eof rema inin~ unpaid and upon compliance -vJi th the contract,
exe cut e a deed to the property conveying the title as fully as if it had
been executed by the deceased obiligor.
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Louise is entitled to both the heater and the rods. At any tLme
~before the interest of third parties has intervened the owner may sever
the connection and r estore a fixture to its original bharacter of personal
property. Severance of a fixture by the owner of land may be actual, by
a detachment of the fixture, or it may be mnstructive by express or implied
agreement on the part of the owner of the land and his future grantee.
He re the agent of Louise and prentis• had agreed that the heater and r~ds
we r e not to be considere d part of tne property to be mnveyed to Pre ntLs,
t hus a constructive severance was brought about. The verbal agreement does
not contradict or very the written deed, which conveyed only the r e al e state
as it was at the time of the delivery, at which time the heater and rods
we re no longer part of it. 184 Va 454.
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PROPERTY J}t, '5. Oul resided on Oul Fann in Loudoun Country, Virc;inia, and executed a
vrri t ten contract of sale vJi th Nonroe by 1vhich he agreed to convey to
l'1onro c "tho fee simple title to Oul Farm for a consideration of $30,000."
Before the closing date, it Has discovered by both parties that there 11as an
outstanding one-sixth interest in the property o1;ncd by Nash, a distant
r elative of Oul, Hho had inherited this interest from the predece ssor in
title. Oul, Hho bad hone s tly believed that he ounod tbe fee simple interest,
did not consciously misrepresent to I1onroo. Houcvcr, Oul realized he could
be deemed negligent in not knouinc; of Nash 's outs tanding interest before he
entered i nto the contract ~ri th I•ionroe. When Nash learned of the contract
and of the facts that Honroe had 1Wil!roatcncd to bring suit for specific
pcrfonnance , he advised Oul that if Oul attempte d to convey all or any part
of the farm, he, Nash, 1·rould bring a suit to enjoin him or bring an action
for damaged.
(a) What are Monroe 1 s richts ac;ainst Oul as to specific p e rformance?
(b) 1:,f hat arc 1'1onroo' s rights against Oul in an action for damages ?
(c) ~i!hat arc Nash ' s rights against Oul for an injunction?
(d) lrJhat arc Nash 1 s rights au;ainst Oul in an action for damages?
(a) In Virc;inia, any transaction, entered into by one 1rho is ignorant
or mistaken of his right, uill be conside r e d in equity as a mistake of fact.
Although a purchase r cannot have a partial inte r est for ce d upon h~n. if he
enters into a contract unauare of the vendor 1 s incapacity to convey tho
"hole , he is e ntitled to specific performance to tho ext ent of the 'vendor' s
capacity and an abatement of the purchas e price to the extent of the unconveyed portion, 137 Va 687. ~nro c should be e ntitled to specific
pe rformance of 5/6 of the property and abatement of 1/ 6 for that part uhich
Oul is incapable of conveying
(b) In lieu of a suit for specific performance Hith an abatement,
Monroe may bring an action at lau for breach of Oul' s contract to convey
a fee simple interest. He may r e cove r provable dama::;es .
(c) Nash cannot e njoin 01rl from s e lling hie undivided 5/6 inter est
in Oul Farm to Mo nro e , One of tho incid<mts of mrnc r ship of prope rty is
the right to dispose of f>amc .
(d) Nash has no ric;ht ar~ainot O·trl in an action fo r damages i f Oul only
conveys his 5/6 interest to Monroe . If Oul purports t o convey the entire fee
to Monroe , then Na0h uill have a cause of action in tort fo r slander of title
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to sell he r home i n Gj l os County, Virc;inia, and mo ve to
a smalle r l1ous o , but since she had r e cently put in a ncu 1rater heater and
neu curtain rods in the
Giles house and vnnted to usc t hem in hGr ncu
homo, she advised tho r eal esta t e ac;cnt, Maxcy, t hat the house uas to be
sold Hithout the heater and the rods
F ~.xc y approached Prcntis in r egard
to purchas ing the house Wlrl.dad\lhiilsrldtthl..ttlbouise , in selling the property~
would r eserve the heater and curtain rods. Prentis r a ised no objection
and agreed to purchase the property. Louise executed the deed 0 but there
was no mention ih the deed of the electric hot wate r hea ter or the curtain
rods. s ubsequent to the conveyanc e , Louise obtaine d a plumber and came to
take the heater and the curtain rods, but Prentis refused to let her have
them pointing out that the heater was connected to the hot water system,
~~L was already in the house, was bolted to the concrete floor and could
t be removed without defacing or injurin~ the house by cutting the pipes~
:~d that the curtain rods would have to be unscrewed from the windows.
.
When prentis was reminded of Maxey's express ~tatement~, he stated that wlu.le
this was true, the deed was controlling and s1nce it dLd not reserve these
items, they, the refore, had passed to him •
Is Louise entitled to either the heater or the rods in an action of
detinue?

3:fi'1deed dated January 2, 1910, and duly recorded, conveyed a farm in Virginia to
William Payne ltfor his life and at his dea·th to Joseph Bro·,m-. 11 Carl Foreman took a
faney to this farm, and in 19~ bought it from Payne, rec:ei'l7ing and recording a
deed purporting to convey with general warranty the farm to him in fee simple.
Pursuant to this deed Foreman took possession of the farm, lived 9n it and built a
handsome residence on it and made other improvements, costing in ·a ll $40,000.
Payne died in January, 1957, and Foreman in July, 1960.
Brown died intestate in 1912, leaving as his only surviving relative a nephew who
now consults you, telling you that he knew nothing about the land transaction until
last week when he accidently discovered a copy of the deed given by Payne; that the
land itself is now worth $20,000, and, with the improvements which Foreman made,
will bring $70 1 000, on today's market. Nephew asks you to advise him fully as to
his rights with respect to the farm and the improvements, which are now in the
possession of Kent, who purchased the property from Foreman's heirs in 1965 and
now claim to be its owner. How ought you to advise him?
(PROPERTY) The nephew gets both the farm and the improvements thereon. He inherited
the remainder interest in the farm, . and the 15 year statute of limitations for
adverse possession has not run against him, as Foreman only began holding adversely
to nephew in 1957~fter the death of Payne. The nephew is also entitled to the
improvements, for a person holding property with notice actual or constructive, of a
defect in his title, is not entitled, upon being dispossessed by the rightful owner,
to recover compensation for permanent improvements made on the premises. Here the
title was bad on the record when Foreman made the improvements on the premises.

•

4~~~'bbed,

a crusty old bachelor, but mentally competent, in 1940 delivered and had
recorded a deed conveying valuable real estate in Virginia to a friend, Mary, then
aged 60 years, "for forty years with remainder to the University of Virginia."
Crabbed died intestate in 1956, and in 1967, his heirs at law instituted appropriate
proceedings to have this deed declared void. Mary, who was still living, and the
University were made parties defendant.
Assuming that the above facts were alleged and proven, how ought the Court to hold~
(PROPERTY) Mary may keep the property for life and the University will get the
remainder interest after 40 years. As this is a vested remainder interest and not a
contingent one, the rule against perpetuities does not apply to defeat the remainder.
1'-'-•

•

,j~er included in-his will the following provision: "I bequeath to my wife for

her life with remainder at her death to John, son of my first marriage, the follow•
ing property(a) my dairy herd, (b) my stock in the City Bank, consisting of,one
hundred sharep,and (o) my two hundred shares of Jupiter, Ino.n
Two years after Farmer's death, City Bank paid each shareholder $25.00 per share
as a return of capital, and Jupiter declared a stock dividend. John and his stepmother each claim the return of capital and the stock dividend. John also insists
that his stepmother must keep enough of the offspring to maintain the dairy herd
at the same approximate number as it was at the time of Farmer's death.
You are consulted. How should you answer the following questionsz
'( a) What disposition should be made of the capital returned by City Bank?
(b) Who is entitled to the Jupiter stock dividend?
(c~ust . the stepmother maintain the dairy herd at its strength as of Farmer's
death .
(PRO Rft)~a) The son should get the return of ~apital, since, under Va. Code 55255(2) such is a part of the corpus of the &state and should be treated as such,
' the remainder
- interest.
going to
(b) The son is entitled to the Jupiter s~ock divjdend. According to Va.Code 55257, all dividends on share of a corporation for~ng a p~rt of the principal which
are payable in the shares of the corporation shall be deemed principal.
(c) Yes. Under va. Code 55-260, when any part of the principal consists of animals
employed in business, all offspring or increase shall be deemed principal to the
extent necessary to maintain the original number of animals and the remainder shall
be deemed income.

•
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6., Dflner Owner had a very fine pocket watch which he had inherited from his grandf ather. While attending an outdoor concert at a pubJ.ic park, he lost the watch. It
was found by Frank Finder w~o r:old :t·t; to Ace Pawn Shcp th e next day. Ace Pawn Shop
promptly displayed t he wat ch wit.h othf:;1' timepieces ar:d o :~>·P::· (;d it for sale t o the
public. John Consumer¥ i n gc•;)d f c:rl t:1 CJ.rlli ~thou t any kn.o~1 l3?g e of its having baen
l os t, purchased the wat ch ona week c:.f t Br 1t was put on dl ''r;:u..a ?. About four mont hs
l a ter Abner owner, while ri<\.i_ng in a bus, observed the W3 t d1 1n the possession of
Jvhn Consumer. After John Consumer had refused his demand to hand over the watch,
Abner Owner consults you and asks whether or not he can recover the watch.
How ought you to advise him?
(PROPERTY,PERSONAL) Owner can reGo~rer the watch from consumer. If the owner of
pereonal pro perty loses i t accidentally, he does not part v.:·i th his titl2, and the
f i nder becomes a quasi depository, invested with such poss essory interest as will
entitle him to hold it against all the world except the ri ght.ful owner. Since a
vandeeL. can receive no greater title than that of the vendor, consumer's interest
enti tles him only to hold the watch a gainst all the world except the owner. Had th 1
owner entrusted the watch to the pawn broker then there would be no right to
recover, but in this case there was no entrustment by the owner.(lR5 Va.474;
69 Va.60l.

9.~~£one,

•
•

14V•

Oscar, owner of Blackacre in Albemarle County, Virginia, decided to give it to
his brother, Beverly. Oscar so informed him by letter dated April 15, 1966, which
letter !everly carefull preserved. On March 15, 1967, Oscar signed a deed and
acknowledged it before a notary public. The granting clause of the deed was 11 Granto!
hereby grants and conveys Blackacre to the Grantee, Beverly.n Immediately after it
was executed, Oscar put the deed in his desk drawer at home. On October 10, 1967,
Oscar died, leaving a will by which he devised and bequeathed all his property t o
his widow and son in equal shares. A few days after the will was admitted to proba t~
the widow found the deed in the desk drawer and gave it to Beverly, who promptly
ree;orded it. What interest, if any, does Beverly hav.e in Blackacre?
(PROPERTY) Beverly has no interest in Blackacre. An e:3 sential requisite to a good
deed is that it be delivered by the grantor or his attorney) and the deed takes
effect only from such a deli·reryo There can be no inference that the gr antor i ntende:
the deed to become operatj_ve u.po!1 his death, since there ca.n be no deli very of a
ct ~ 0 d by a dead hand. A deed, or s~ch, must operate, if at all, inter ~~v0s.
(115 Va.323; 128 Va.l)

Inc. has operated a small manufacturing plant on its
number of years. Four years ago, it enlarged its oper t·
d property for a
't
a
lOn
an
Wl.th the result that, wh;le
•
1 uses reasonable care to prevent cihtanged its product
fumes, dust and smoke from the operation damage Neighbor'
d . ~ nevertheless
· hb or, who a~qu1re
· d h1s
· property in 1960, consults you s and
a jo1mng
prope r t Y•
Ne1g
asks
any, he has aga1nst Stone. How ought you to advise him?
what redress, if
(PROPERTY,TORTS) Neighbor may obtain an injunction and d
which are offensive and disagreeable in such a manner as~ages for nuisance. Odors
and damage property rights constitute a nuisance. A nuisan~ rende: l~fe uncomfortable
established plant is permanent in its character· and an~t 1.e ctonslstlng of an
·
'
c on
past and f uture, f or sue h a nu1sance
must be brought
withi
fi o recover da mages,
the cau~e of action oc~urred. Furthermore, the importance ~f a~ei~~ars from the time
prosper1ty of a commun1ty does not give it a right to in r th 0
ustry_ to the
The question to be answered is whether the bus i ness is 80ju e d ~te who llve nea:rby,
.
. f ac t • St one has no prescripti ve r i ght beca conth uc .ed as . to cons --·~ ltu~e
,
a nu1sanc
e 1n
resulti ng in the nuis ance took place only f our years ear~~e
~ op~ratlonal change
1
reas onable care was exerc i sed i nfluence the f act that a
~r. or oes the fact that
created.(l72 Va.J42,357; 119 Va.862; 203 Va.711; 8-24) nulsance was in fact

